Presentation (English)

The 8th Congress of the Society for the Philosophy of Science will be held at the University of Mons (Belgium) from 9 to 11 September 2020.

Given the current situation and issues concerning the coronavirus, the congress of the SPS will be postponed to september 2021. A new call for abstracts will be opened in due time on the usual channels. We apologize for any inconvenience.

Click here for the 2021 edition : https://sps2021.sciencesconf.org/

The theme of the 2020 congress will be: Science and scientificity.

However, any proposal for a contribution in the field of philosophy of science will be considered.

Description of the theme

Science and pseudoscience

Distinction between science and pseudoscience has always been a central issue in philosophy of science. The search for criteria that would allow this distinction to be formulated has indeed often led to important advances in the field of epistemology.

To understand the boundary between science and pseudoscience, it is necessary to identify the criteria on which it is built. For example, we will distinguish the pseudoscience of parodic science, the latter being a form of deliberate and claimed caricature. Similarly, pseudoscience is not reducible to bad science, which is rather poorly executed and is not intended to deliberately mislead the public. If the notions of method or truth/false are not foreign to pseudoscience, they are not sufficient to differentiate or delimit it. Nor can the question of the distinction be reduced to the theme of manipulation and intentions, since most founders and followers of pseudoscience are doing so in good faith. The question is already not simple with regard to established and recognized science, but is particularly difficult with regard to new science or, to use Kuhn's term, prescience, which has not yet acquired the right to be heard and which is also distinguished from pseudoscience in that it will give rise, but in the future, to science. However, it is often on the basis of a projection in the future and the fact that revolutionary theories have not often been immediately accepted in the past (sometimes referred to as Galileo's syndrome) that pseudosciences claim full scientific status.

Philosophy of science therefore has two main reasons for taking an interest in this issue. On the practical side, this critical approach makes it possible to build tools to neutralise these pseudoscientific theories, tools whose effectiveness is also a matter of debate. On the theoretical side, these subjects are in a way case studies that highlight the advantages and disadvantages of different epistemological approaches. The question of pseudoscience is then of great interest in the philosophy of science. As an object of analysis, it makes it possible to question the scientific methodology, to clarify the relationshipbetween truth andscientific theories, to question the status of empirical date or to analyse the formation and questioning of consensus in the scientific community.

This theme is not new, but it is particularly relevant in an era of omnipresent social networks and widespread access to a huge reservoir of information, insofar as pseudoscientific theories find particularly fertile ground for development. One will think of the recent debates about the delisting of homeopathy in France, which shows that the distinction between science and pseudoscience is far from evident.

Science and technology

The spread of access to the Internet and more generally to computer tools has also deeply changed the way science is done and perceived. The methods of publishing scientific articles have changed drastically; the journals, now available online, have gained in visibility and accessibility and we are seeing the emergence of a true open source culture that tends to strengthen the cohesion of a global scientific community. An example of a significant change in scientific methodology brought about by these technologies is the publication of negative results. This type of article was recently very marginal, with researchers rarely wishing to start a long writing process, often resulting in a refusal for publication if it was only to announce that they had not obtained the expected results. Today, the diversity of publication possibilities has led to the emergence of journals specialising in negative results (such as the eponymous journal), which makes it possible to give pride of place to one of the criteria of scientificity generally considered central to the definition of science, in this case refutability.

The increase in the amount of data available, as well as the ease of accessing, sharing and circulating scientific literature, has also changed the way science is perceived by the general public. Science popularization, once reserved for science communication professionals and very costly to produce, is now often carried out by researchers themselves through platforms such as YouTube that connect scientists directly with the general public. It is therefore access to the whole scientific culture that is strengthened, and which thus subjects science to the test of explanatory clarity, a real test of the clarity of the scientists' own conception, since we know it well, "whatever is well conceived is clearly said...". Participatory science, another example of a practice that has recently expanded rapidly, can involve thousands of Internet users who, each performing a simple task, collect important data, sometimes leading to major discoveries. One could conclude that science is really a method and not a profession, if the contributions of non-specialists are just as relevant as those of scientists. However, it can also be seen as a loss of the desired guarantees of seriousness.

Indeed, rigorous initiatives (such as Zooniverse in astronomy) remain marginal and there is no denying a certain withdrawal of scientists into a technicality that can sometimes hinder their objectivity, as well as a desertion from the field of popularization that the pseudosciences are hastily occupying. Between this technical level, which is inaccessible without prerequisites, and the oversimplified level (at the risk of distorting the correct concepts) at which most of the popularization takes place, one may wonder what an intermediate level should look like and how to promote one that truly allows everyone to have a deep understanding of the mechanisms at work in the world around them. The demand for this intermediate level is there, as evidenced by the many videographers whose cultural channels flourish on online platforms, as well as the abundance of scientific book shelves in bookstores. However, these spontaneous responses to the demand are not always adequate and highlight the need for theoretical clarification of the scientific criteria in order to allow their democratization.

Challenges imposed by the evolution of scientific practices

Moreover, the re-evaluation of knowledge, which is based in particular on the reproduction of results and spreads over long time scales, is reduced by the "publish or perish" context, which reflects the incentive for productivity that prevails in other areas of society. Moreover, both transmission and exploration are conditioned by fashion phenomena that favour certain attractive subjects (or lead to possible technological applications) to the detriment of less valued subjects, which leads to inequalities in funding. The search for funding becomes an integral part of the researcher's work, sometimes going so far as to completely replace his or her research. Are these sociological and economic constraints applied to the research community intrinsic to any practice of science and do they call into question the objectivity of science itself or can its practice be purified by a theoretical reaffirmation of the conditions necessary for the production of scientific knowledge?

There are also some initiatives that counter these trends, such as the open data mentioned above or the slow science movement. Are they a symptom of conservatism reluctant to the rapid progress of science or, on the contrary, a way of circumventing obstacles which are disguised as progress?

The question of scientificity is therefore, through the diversity of its aspects, not only very topical, but also a major issue of our time.

Invited Speakers

Brigitte Axelrad (Association Française pour l’Information Scientifique): "Mémoire retrouvée ou faux souvenirs : la controverse"
Jean-Pierre Cléro (Université de Rouen): "L'irrationnel des sciences et l'irrationnel de la superstition"
Guillaume Lecointre (Muséum national d’histoire naturelle): "Enjeux politiques d'une scientificité explicite"
Stephan Lewandowsky (University of Bristol): "Science In A ‘Post-Truth’ World"
Alan Sokal (New York University): "Does science make metaphysical assumptions?"
Marion Vorms (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne): "Doute raisonnable, scepticisme infondé et dogmatisme scientiste"

Call for papers

Deadline for submission : 30 April 2020

Submission via the website

Individual paper :

In french or in english
Suitable for a 30 minute presentation (discussion included)
About the theme of the meeting or any other topic in philosophy of science

Symposium (3 people) :

In french or in english
Suitable for a 90 or 120 minute symposium, depending on how many interventions
About the theme of the meeting or any other topic in philosophy of science

Submission format :

Short abstract + extended abstract joined in .pdf or .doc

For a symposium :

Title of the symposium
Short abstract (max. 250 words) describing the general topic
Extended anonymous abstract in a separated file (.pdf or .doc, max. 2500 words) describing the symposium in general and each presentation (max. 4 participants)

Individual paper :